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Political Scandal at the End of Ideology? The Mediatized Politics of the  
Bo Xilai case  
 
If you visit Sina Weibo every day, you’ll think there will be revolution tomorrow; 
if you go to the farmers’ market every morning, you’ll think a revolution is not 
going to happen for another hundred years! (personal interview, Sept. 26, 2011) 
 
I heard the comment above when doing field work in China and it came from an active 
participant in several Chinese online communities. It struck me as an astute observation of 
the discrepancy between the online and offline worlds. Much as pundits are eager to detect 
signs of democratization or even regime change in the lively debates on the Chinese Internet, 
there are several key factors that stop us from treating online political discussion as an 
accurate barometer of offline politics. First, there is the state’s effort not only to suppress 
certain discourses online but also to initiate and cultivate others. Censorship goes hand in 
hand with proactive measures to shape public opinion. Second, media institutions are actively 
positioning themselves on the ideological spectrum in line with their own interests and 
operational logic. Sometimes this puts the media in opposition to the government, at other 
times the media logic coincides with the government agenda. Third, the social stratification in 
contemporary Chinese society is such that not only is netizens’ online discussion highly 
polemical; the visibility of different social groups is also mediated by their media access and 
the communication resources they possess. The dynamics between these three interlinking 
aspects highlight the empirical and theoretical challenges of understanding politics in a 
mediatized society (Hepp, 2012; Hjarvard, 2008; Strömbäck, 2008), where the media play an 
increasingly important role in constituting political conflicts and power struggles. 
                                                                                                                Mediatized Politics 
 2 
      In this article, I use the high-profile Bo Xilai case to illustrate the dialectics of media and 
politics in contemporary China. The dismissal and trial of the former Chongqing Party 
Secretary is arguably the most significant Chinese political scandal of recent decades. Some 
have even compared the magnitude of this ‘political earthquake’ with the downfall of Mao’s 
designated heir Lin Biao in 1971 or the crackdown on the 1989 student movement (Zhao, 
2012b). As the son of a prominent Communist Party (CCP) leader, Bo Yibo, Bo Xilai was in 
the inner circle of China’s top political elite. Prior to his assignment to Chongqing, Bo had 
been the Mayor of Dalian, Provincial Governor of Liaoning and Minister of Commerce, with 
a successful political record. There was wide speculation before his dismissal in March 2012 
that Bo would become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee after the 18
th
 Party 
Congress, which was scheduled to take place later that year. In contrast to most other cases of 
ousted officials, where media coverage has rarely veered from the basic storyline of the Party 
ridding itself of yet another bad seed, narratives of the Bo Xilai case were fraught with 
contradictions and contestation. Not only were international news outlets and Chinese 
citizens activated in an unprecedented manner to construct various versions of the Bo saga, 
but even the central leadership used new tactics to exploit global communication networks 
(Wang, 2012). Yet there has been little academic research interrogating the role of the media 
in configuring the trajectory of the event. Hence the empirical aim of this article is to unpack 
the media logic underlying the highly publicized downfall of Bo Xilai. In the meantime, 
given that studies of mediatized political scandals have so far focused only on Western liberal 
democratic countries, the Chinese case offers an important critique of the current theorization 
of ‘power and visibility in the media age’ (Thompson, 2000). I start by explaining some of 
the similarities and key differences between mediatized politics in the West and in China. 
This leads to an emphasis on the ideological dimension of media logic that is largely missing 
from discussions derived from a liberal democratic context. I then analyze the dialectics of 
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the mediatized ideological struggle and politicized media logic running through the Bo Xilai 
scandal. In the last section I summarize the theoretical contributions that the Chinese case 
makes to the study of mediatized politics.  
 
 
Mediatized political scandal and ideological struggle 
 
For those doing research on the interrelation between media and politics, one of the key 
themes is how ‘media logic’ shapes the way that politics operates. While Altheide and Snow 
(1979: 10) briefly define media logic as ‘the process through which media present and 
transmit information,’ the concept has been further explicated as referring to the storytelling 
techniques of the mass media, including simplification, polarization, intensification, 
personalization, visualization, stereotypization and framing (Mazzoleni, 1987; Strömbäck, 
2008). Some of these techniques have to do with the technological features of a particular 
medium, but more importantly they are a series of choices made by media professionals and 
media institutions in order to sell more of their informational products (Strömbäck & Esser, 
2014). In fact, many have argued that media logic is essentially the market logic followed by 
media outlets as commercial enterprises (Landerer, 2013; Mazzoleni, 2008; Strömbäck, 2008; 
Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). Such an orientation is often in conflict with the normative role 
that the mass media are expected to fulfill in a liberal democracy in terms of sustaining 
rational deliberation on public affairs.  
      On the other hand, political logic is ‘understood as shaped by the combined forces of 
three dimensions: polity, policy and politics’ (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014:  383). In other 
words, political logic is contingent upon the overall political framework in any given country, 
the incentives to win political power, and the need to initiate policy changes. Needless to say, 
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the media are a crucial source of information about politics in modern societies. As 
institutions with a ‘huge concentration of symbolic power and of the means to describe the 
world’ (Couldry, 2012:  69), the media, together with their corporate advertisers, have an 
increasing stake in sustaining what Couldry calls the ‘myth of the mediated center,’ which 
provides common reference points for any media users to make sense of the world 
surrounding them. As Carey (1989:  87) puts it, ‘reality is a scarce resource. The fundamental 
form of power is the power to define, allocate and display this resource.’ Because of this 
power, political actors are shaping their actions toward positive media coverage while 
attempting to control media input and outcomes. If politics is about decision making and 
policy implementation, the constant attempts by the media to seek profit through grabbing 
attention undermine this, to say the least.  
      Thompson argues that the process of media logic seeping into political logic has given 
rise to mediated political scandals in Western liberal democracies. With regard to the 
development of the media, sophisticated and ubiquitous modern communication 
technologies, combined with a changing culture of journalism that is oriented toward 
investigative reporting, have rendered what Thompson calls ‘the mediated visibility of 
political leaders’ particularly important (Thompson, 2000:  108). On the political front, the 
key shift is that class-based ‘ideological politics’ is gradually giving way to a ‘politics of 
trust’ based on specific policy packages offered by political parties. It is in this context that 
the individual character of political leaders, rather than their class affiliation, becomes 
susceptible to disclosure by the media of transgression and wrongdoing.  
      Moving from North American and Western European contexts to China, what is useful 
about the discussion outlined above is its emphasis on the institutional and discursive power 
of the media. Partly because of the strong statist tradition in China and partly because of the 
Western-centric imagination of an omnipotent Chinese Communist Party (CCP), researchers 
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tend to perceive the media as on the receiving end of political power. Both in the study of 
Internet censorship and in the investigation of changing journalistic practices, for example, 
the behavior of media organizations or media professionals is usually interpreted as first and 
foremost the product of state control and regulation. Studies of mediatized politics in non-
Chinese contexts have highlighted the endogenous factors that influence media decisions on 
whether and how to tell a story, especially the market logic that is fundamental to the 
economic viability of media institutions. By examining the Bo Xilai scandal as a mediatized 
event, I want to bring attention to the ways in which the media take part in producing the 
political dynamics of today’s China.  
      Nonetheless, analyzing the Bo Xilai case as a mediatized political scandal requires some 
reconceptualization of the relationship between media and politics, as well as of the political 
logic itself in a historicized Chinese context. Studies so far have emphasized the influence of 
the media on politicians and political campaigns in Western liberal democracies, where the 
legitimacy of the political regime derives from electoral politics and media institutions enjoy 
a relatively high level of autonomy. As Downing (1996) points out, a major limitation of 
Western media theories is that they have evolved from and are used to explain a relatively 
stable political economy. In countries like China, not only are the actual practices of media 
institutions and politicians in a more complicated state of flux and hybridity, but the 
normative orientation of what the media and politics are supposed to achieve is also 
contested. In terms of contestation over the nature of the regime, Wang Hui (2009: 9) uses 
the term ‘depoliticized politics’ to characterize the CCP’s transition from a revolutionary 
party to a state party, which ‘no longer conforms to its past political role, but becomes a 
component of the state apparatus.’  As the boundary between the political elite and the 
owners of capital becomes increasingly blurred, the party is changing its class basis. Class-
based politics has now been superseded by negotiations around bureaucratic governance. 
                                                                                                                Mediatized Politics 
 6 
Wang further argues that the ‘market-ideological apparatuses have a strong depoliticizing 
character,’ as political divisions between labor and capital, left and right, are replaced by 
‘technical disputes about market adjustment mechanisms.’ (p. 13) In contrast, through both 
his policy agenda and his political rhetoric, which I will explicate in the later section, Bo 
Xilai invoked the class antagonism and the socialist promise of equality that the central 
leadership has been carefully containing.   
      As for media logic, it is also far less settled than what Strömbäck and Esser (Strömbäck & 
Esser, 2014) summarized as comprising the three dimensions of professionalism, 
commercialism and media technology. Not to romanticize the autonomy of the media in 
liberal democracies, the media in China are a more integral component of the ‘ideological 
apparatuses’ and serve more directly as the mouthpiece of the Party-state. In addition to the 
issue of heeding the Party line, however, the bottom line of market imperatives is no less, if 
not more, consequential in shaping the thoroughly commercialized Chinese media institutions. 
As an affluent, urban middle class emerges as the most desirable target audience, and as 
access to the media is differentiated on the basis of purchasing power, media 
commercialization has resulted in social discrimination and social exclusion (Lü & Zhao, 
2010; Pan, 2010; Zhao, 2008). By aligning their production with the demands and concerns 
of the middle class, the commercial media have rendered peasants and workers voiceless and 
invisible. The social groups that used to form the class basis of the CCP now constitute the 
most disenfranchised population. While displacing the socialist values of collectivity and 
equality in favor of a consumerist orientation toward individual choice and autonomy, the 
commercial media constantly generate discourses that justify capitalism as a form of wealth 
production and distribution superior to socialism.  
      In this sense, far from being the kind of post-ideological political scandal that Thompson 
(2000) focused on in his book, the Bo Xilai case is deeply ideological. Bo’s political agenda 
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and his leadership style not only brought to the fore the intense ideological struggle between 
Party factions, but also polarized public opinion, with mediatized manifestations of both 
these phenomena. In the ideological war of position (Gramsci, 1971/2008:  108-110), media 
organizations do not just serve as platforms or instruments of certain interest groups, they 
themselves are important players that actively engage in the ideological struggle. The media 
coverage of the Bo Xilai case was by no means a concerted effort derived from some kind of 
consensus indicating a sharing of common goals. Before the official announcement of Bo’s 
expulsion in March 2012, it was the mainstream domestic media that did most reporting on 
Bo Xilai and his policies in Chongqing. Between early 2012 and the trial of Bo in the 
summer of 2013, the international news media and the Internet played a more prominent role, 
as domestic news outlets had little choice but to toe the official line after the case became a 
major political scandal. In August 2013, the unprecedented “live webcast” of Bo’s trial once 
again turned the Internet into the center of attention and communication. Despite the 
ostensible differences in reporting style and details, there were surprisingly consistent threads 
running across different platforms and these warrant further probing. 
      To untangle the “intriguing and complex communicative politics around the Bo saga” 
(Zhao, 2012b), I develop my argument on the basis of two interconnecting themes,  the 
mediatized ideological struggle and the politicized media logic. The empirical material for 
this article came from both primary and secondary sources. I conducted a discourse analysis 
of policy documents, news articles published by both party-organ and mainstream 
commercial newspapers, as well as posts on major online forums. I monitored the webcast of 
Bo Xilai’s trial closely, archived and analyzed both the daily release of court trancripts and 
readers’ comments. I also conducted informal interviews with more than a dozen journalists 
in order to get a sense of how media professionals were navigating the delicate and complex 
situation. The secondary material garnered from existing research provides important 
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contextual information that helps to put contemporary media politics in China into a much-
needed historical perspective.  
 
 
The mediatized ideological struggle 
 
Ever since China embarked on economic reform in the late 1970s, the tension between a 
capitalist economy and a nominally communist ruling party has been a thorny issue for the 
regime. No other country has had a similar situation in which a state that was forged by a 
communist revolution and still claims to be building socialism has been pursuing ‘a paradigm 
of development that was the product of capitalism’ (Dirlik, 2005). The ‘cat theory’ 
enunciated by Deng Xiaoping, who is credited as the ‘chief designer of China’s reform and 
opening-up,’ was an ingenious move to circumvent ideological debate by means of the purest 
pragmatism. As China became further integrated into global capitalism, later generations of 
the central leadership resorted to different rhetoric to articulate the CCP’s political agenda 
amidst growing socioeconomic inequalities. From Jiang Zemin’s ‘three represents’ to Hu 
Jintao’s ‘scientific outlook on development’ and ‘harmonious society’ and Xi Jinping’s 
‘Chinese dream,’ it was no coincidence that all these shied away from directly engaging with 
class-based politics and the socialist ideal of building a ‘people’s democracy’ led by the 
working class. To be sure the party still derives much of its legitimacy from the legacy of 
socialist revolution (Shue, 2004), yet it is also true that the socialist ideals of equality, social 
justice and morality are now frequently invoked in social protest (Lee, 2007; Lin, 2006; 
O’Brien & Li, 2006). The disenfranchised peasants and workers who have been exploited and 
repressed in the capitalist transformation are trying to hold the party accountable for its initial 
promises.  
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      Under such circumstance, it is crucial for the CCP to secure the ‘commanding heights’ of 
the rapidly expanding media scene (Zhao, 2008), especially when it comes to the 
reinterpretation of class politics and the appropriation of revolutionary history, both of which 
are ideological sources that Bo Xilai drew heavily upon in articulating his political agenda. 
On his appointment as Party Secretary of Chongqing in 2007, Bo implemented a series of 
initiatives to address both economic and social problems in this large inland city. On the 
economic front, the local government significantly enlarged the public sector and its role in 
the economy. As a 2012 Foreign Policy article put it, this was ‘a daring experiment in using 
state policy and state resources to advance the interests of ordinary people’(Liu, 2012). Bo’s 
social policies emphasized distributive justice (minsheng, which literally translates as 
livelihood), which included low-income housing projects, a reformed hukou registration 
system that eased the migration of rural residents into the cities, and a land exchange 
mechanism to maximize the usage of farmland (Cui, 2011)
1
.  
      Not only did Bo emphasize social equality and wealth redistribution, he also tried to 
revitalize ‘red culture’ by promoting socialist cultural symbols and public service media. He 
Shizhong, the Chongqing Propaganda Chief under Bo Xilai, explained the four key 
dimensions of ‘red culture’: chang (singing red songs), du (reading the classics), jiang 
(telling stories) and chuan (spreading slogans) (He, 2010). These four activities were 
intended not only to mobilize support for Bo’s economic and social policies, but also to 
formulate counter-hegemonic discourses to combat the corrosive influence of commercialism 
and consumerism. Strangely enough, for the first time since the CCP embarked on its course 
of ‘socialist marketization,’ which has been criticized by many on the Left as having a strong 
neoliberal component (Harvey, 2005; Ong, 2006; Wang, 2009), it was the Chongqing Party 
Secretary rather than the central government who articulated a more coherent political agenda 
in which policy and rhetoric were better aligned under socialist rubrics.  
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      The news of Bo Xilai’s dismissal was released to the public in a peculiar manner. On 
February 6, 2012, rumors started circulating on Weibo that Chongqing Police Chief Wang 
Lijun had fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu to seek assistance, allegedly after falling out 
with Bo. Wang was Bo’s right-hand man in his famed campaign against organized crime and 
was even featured in a television drama as a ‘gangbuster hero.’ The rumor was quickly 
picked up by Western media (e.g., Branigan, 2012; Hille, 2012; Johnson, 2012b), while the 
domestic media kept silent. On March 14, at the closing press conference of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC), in answering the final question from a Reuters reporter regarding 
Wang Lijun, Premier Wen Jiabao accused the Chongqing leadership of reviving the Cultural 
Revolution. Wen referred to the CCP’s 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History 
of Our Party, which officially declared the Cultural Revolution to have been a ‘disaster for 
the country and the people.’ He then warned against repeating that historical tragedy:  
What has happened shows that any practice that we adopt must be based on 
experience and lessons we have learned from history and must serve the people’s 
interests. The actions that we take must be able to stand the test of history and reality. 
I believe that everyone in China understands this, and I have confidence in our future. 
      For anyone who understands Chinese history and the Party’s verdict on the Cultural 
Revolution, Wen’s seemingly banal statement carries a strong message. It designates what 
happened in Chongqing as a forbidden subject, just like the Cultural Revolution itself, ‘not 
available for public debate or historical analysis and fit only for political condemnation’ 
(Wang, 2012: 14). Around 9 o’clock on the morning of the 15th, the online People’s Daily 
hinted on Weibo that there was about to be ‘an important news announcement.’ At 10.03 
a.m., the Xinhua news agency reported on Weibo that Bo Xilai had been removed as 
Chongqing Party Secretary.  
      In the ensuing 18 months leading up to the trial, the official news on Bo was kept to a 
                                                                                                                Mediatized Politics 
 11 
minimum, with only a few terse reports from Xinhua. Mainstream commercial newspapers 
were largely silent on the topic, while party-organ newspapers such as the People’s Daily and 
Guangming Daily called with a concerted editorial voice for unity and support for the party’s 
decision (Wong & Ansfield, 2012). In the meantime, leftist websites supportive of Bo, such 
as Utopia (wuyou zhixiang), were shut down. On the other hand, overseas websites such as 
Boxun and the Falun Gong site Epoch Times, which had long been deemed ‘hostile’ by the 
party-state, suddenly became accessible in China (Zhao, 2012a:  10). Discussions on the 
former tended to view Bo as the victim of the ‘line struggle’ (luxian douzheng) between the 
neo-liberal approach and the more egalitarian developmental path that the Chongqing Model 
represents. The latter group, however, accused Bo of wanting to return China to the dark age 
of the Cultural Revolution. From the perspective of the CCP’s top leaders, the last thing they 
were willing to acknowledge was how the Bo Xilai incident had brought to the center of the 
global stage the long-existing fight between different party factions. That is to say, Bo and his 
Chongqing Model invoked a series of significant questions about the legacy and the future of 
Chinese socialism that the CCP central leadership found too difficult to confront. In order to 
minimize the disruption to the current market-oriented, developmentalist approach, the top 
leaders opted for a non-ideological frame that defined the confrontation as a disciplinary 
action by the Party against a corrupt official. 
      The central leadership’s strategy for coping with the unprecedented visibility of political 
in-fighting was to structure the terms of the mediatization to its own advantage. On the 
surface, the decision to have a ‘live webcast’ of the trial on Sina Weibo was a surprising act 
of transparency. This was an example of political actors adapting their behavior to the 
media’s ‘attention rules, production routines, selection criteria and molding mechanism.’ 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999:  251) Posting court transcripts with a slight delay was an 
ingenious move to harness the power of digital networks—it greatly enhanced the perceived 
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legitimacy of the handling of the case, while retaining control. The unexpected drama in the 
courtroom, such as Bo’s wife and his former closest ally testifying against him, his firm 
denial of every single charge by the prosecutor, his reluctant disclosure of the affair between 
Gu Kailai and Wang Lijun, were all riveting and captured the attention of the whole nation. 
More importantly, the surprising details revealed through the Weibo account of what was 
taking place in the Jinan Intermediate Court seemed to reinforce the notion that the trial was 
fair, rather than one of those highly scripted shows intended simply to close the chapter on a 
disgraced official.  
      Paradoxically, as Sina Weibo became the central node not only connecting other 
networks but also feeding information between different channels, the high level of 
interconnection enabled even more control of information. Compared with the traditional 
media, the interactivity of digital networks has made it easier to monitor them and to respond 
to dissenting voices and counter-hegemonic discourses in real time. According to Chen Tong, 
Chief Editor of sina.com, the company tripled the number of their breaking-news staff to 
work on the reporting of the trial (Xu, 2013). The extra personnel worked mainly on two 
tasks, one proactive and one reactive. To supplement the text-only court transcripts, sina.com 
provided extensive multi-media background information on the witnesses in the case and the 
major events mentioned in the trial. The fact that the ‘live webcast’ was on Sina’s 
microblogging platform gave it an unbeatable advantage over its competitors, such as Sohu 
and Tencent. Sina knew all too well that the advantage was contingent upon toeing the Party 
line, hence the information-filtering mechanism they put in place was equally extensive. For 
example, according to my observation, within half an hour of the release of the first court 
transcript, the number of comments on the Court’s official Weibo account grew to more than 
1,200, then quickly dropped to less than 600. The comments deleted were those praising Bo 
Xilai and questioning the fairness of the trial, such as ‘Bo is a good person and people in 
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Dalian miss him,’ ‘Bo Xilai turned Chongqing into a much better place, we are grateful to 
him,’ ‘the winners crowned and the loser vilified (chengwang baikou).’ Further, comments 
applauding the transparency of the trial and how the case represented the progress of the 
Chinese legal system were pushed to the top. Many of these were left by newly registered 
“zombie” accounts, leading to wide speculation that these were the ‘Internet water army’ 
(wangluo shuijun) hired by Sina to manipulate online public opinion. The top comments were 
likely to be picked up by mainstream newspapers as evidence of the ‘people’s voice.’ Sina 
would subsequently borrow these comments from the mainstream media to frame the next 
day’s trial reportage.  
      Online opinion leaders were closely monitored, but this time it was the leftists (such as @
张宏良，@司马平邦，and @孔庆东), rather than the liberals, who were censored or 
subject to temporary suspension of their accounts. Offline, Bo’s grassroots supporters 
congregated outside the Intermediate Court of Jinan and their activities during the five-day 
trial were filmed for a documentary called Spectators (Weiguan zhe) made by journalist Liu 
Xiangnan using a hand-held camera. But within China the documentary could only be 
circulated under the radar, and outside China very few people even knew about it. This 
segment of the ‘people’s voice,’ dissenting from the official narrative, was never heard by a 
wider audience.  
      In the age of global networks, with observers ranging from global media to Chinese 
netizens all watching intensively the unfolding of the event, it was simply impossible to exert 
total control. Indeed, what the party aimed for was no longer full control of every single 
information channel, but rather a dominant frame that would assimilate fragments of ‘leaks’ 
and ‘rumors’ into a largely coherent narrative. As Zhao (2008:  33) points out, ‘the party’s 
answer to the poststructuralist question of ‘how control exists after decentralization’ is the 
decentralization of control.’  
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Politicized media logic 
 
The mainstream commercial media started playing a significant role in defining Bo Xilai and 
his Chongqing Model well before the scandal erupted. To a large extent, the different 
accounts of what the Chongqing Model was and the varied assessments of its success (or 
failure) are themselves closely linked to commentators’ ideological viewpoints. Leftist 
intellectuals discussed whether the economic and social policies being carried out in 
Chongqing were attempts to revitalize socialism in China (e.g. Cui, 2012; Wang, 2012; Zhao, 
2012b), while mainstream news media predominately paid attention to the crackdown on 
organized crime, commonly dubbed ‘striking down black’ (dahei), and the ‘singing red’ 
(changhong) campaign, which promoted revolutionary and nationalist culture. These colorful 
catchphrases were utilized frequently by both the party organs and the commercial media to 
characterize the political agenda in Chongqing. First of all, by always singling out the 
‘singing red’ initiative from other policy initiatives in Chongqing, the mainstream media 
hollowed out its political significance. For example in the two articles about ‘singing red’ 
published in the May 12
th
,
 
2011, issue of Southern Weekend, China’s flagship liberal 
newspaper, the reporters focused on how best to organize an American-Idol-style talent show 
featuring revolutionary songs (hongge hui), including the difficulty of securing commercial 
sponsorship. One of the articles, very tellingly, was titled ‘Singing red is just another form of 
cultural consumption.’ (Su & Nie, 2011). A campaign that aimed to achieve ‘not only a new 
subjectivity and cultural self-confidence, but also a sense that a better future is possible’ 
(Zhao, 2012b:  6) was thus neutralized and depicted as ‘just another show.’ Second, when the 
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media coverage did make political references, these were not to the development model that 
Chongqing had been experimenting with, but to the Cultural Revolution. Rather than linking 
the ‘singing red’ campaign with the current agenda of reclaiming the revolutionary legacy 
through prioritizing livelihood (minsheng) and common prosperity (gongfu), headline photos 
of big groups waving red flags depicted an image of ‘red terror.’ Interestingly, both the 
People’s Daily, the central party-organ newspaper, and Cai Jing, a liberal news magazine 
acclaimed by many in the West, published comments that connected the ‘red culture’ in 
Chongqing with the Cultural Revolution.  
      The tactical framing turned into explicit criticism when it came to the radical reform of 
Chongqing Satellite TV (CTV), which, along with mass mobilization, was the other major 
component of the ‘red culture’ campaign. In January 2011, CTV announced that it would 
replace prime-time television drama with ‘red culture programming.’ In March of that year, 
CTV stopped broadcasting commercials and converted to a public service model. The huge 
revenue loss of 300 million RMB per year as a result of dropping advertising was partly 
compensated for by government subsidy. The Propaganda Minister, He Shizhong, defined the 
new nature of CTV as the government providing cultural products to the people as a public 
service, and emphasized that ‘people should not only be the audience of CTV, but also the 
active participants. The quality of the CTV programming relies on the judgment and 
participation of the people.’ (He, quoted by Zhao, 2011) The critical voices centered around 
two main points. First, there was a unanimous verdict that the ‘law of the market’ (shichang 
guilv) should be the gold standard observed by all media organizations, regardless of what 
type of service they were providing. Some proclaimed that getting rid of commercials would 
lead to a ‘winter of CTV,’ as those responsible had ‘made a U-turn by contravening the law 
of media development. If all the television stations go back to ground zero as CTV is doing, 
our nation might as well not reform and open up’ (Wang, & Hu, quoted by Zhao, 2011) Yu 
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Guoming, a journalism professor at Renmin University, was quoted as saying that ‘the reason 
why people can now watch television for free was because advertisers paid for the 
programming. If television stations stop broadcasting commercials, they have to rely on 
either government subsidy or a license fee, both of which are eventually taxpayers’ money. 
Isn’t it funny that you would rather pay the bill yourself even if somebody offered to pay it 
for you?’ (Yu, quoted by Lv, 2011) What goes hand-in-hand with the blind faith in the 
market is the denial of the publicness of CTV’s new model. One columnist writing for the 
business section of Netease, one of the major portal sites in China, pointed out that ‘public 
service broadcasters such as BBC and NHK are funded by license fees rather than 
government subsidy. CTV has to use 150 million RMB in taxpayer’s money annually since 
the elimination of commercials. This is not only returning to the age of the command 
economy, but will also undermine the autonomy of news production.’2  
      Through a series of discursive positionings, the commercial media first severed the 
linkage between the campaign and China’s socialist legacy, then recontexualized it in relation 
to the neoliberal hegemony.  By separating cultural policies from the social agenda being 
implemented in Chongqing, the mainstream media bracketed out any components of the ‘red 
culture’ campaign that resonated with ordinary people, especially with socially marginalized 
groups that did not benefit as much as others from the market economy. To deny such 
resonance is to turn a blind eye both to the historical trajectory and to any future possibility of 
Chinese socialism–which had been a conscious effort to resist global capitalism, and still 
could be if resurrected (Lin, 2006). It is, then, only a logical follow-up, rather than a 
coincidence, that the two themes emerging from the commentaries on CTV reform represent 
the ‘core values’ of neoliberalism—that marketization is synonymous with progress and that 
state intervention restricts freedom and obstructs development. The mainstream commercial 
media, far from being passive recipients of the combined force of the state and the market, 
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are actively configuring the political matrix they operate from by taking up a strategic 
position on the ideological spectrum.  
      With Bo Xilai’s sudden fall from strong contender for a central leadership position to 
dismissed official awaiting trial, online forums and international media took the place of the 
mainstream domestic media as the key information source–for obvious reasons. As a result, a 
Chinese political scandal became a global media spectacle configured by the power structure 
of the information networks. The level of connectivity of different social actors, which 
includes not only access to networks per se, but also the ability to influence others, is highly 
stratified. As Curran (2012: 9) reminds us, the impact of the Internet is not dictated by its 
technology, rather it is ‘filtered through the structures and processes of society.’ Inequalities 
within and across countries can distort online dialogue in many different ways. For instance, 
as the world marvels at the number of Chinese Internet users, which reached 618 million by 
December 2013, what is often neglected is the fact that this is only 45.8% of the population. 
It is worth noting that, although the international media tend to refer to Bo’s leadership style 
as ‘populist,’ the disenfranchised groups that benefited most from his social policies rarely 
had a voice in either mainstream or digital media. Rather, it was political and media elites, 
both within and outside China, that had the strongest presence in global networks. In the 
mediatized spectacle of Bo Xilai’s downfall, no single actor was able to exert full control 
over the networks, but a dominant narrative concerning the nature of this political struggle 
was established when the positions of different actors converged.  
      The apparent political significance of the case, the state censorship that led to the scarcity 
of official reports, the media’s urge to maintain their status as the privileged point of access 
to reality (Couldry, 2003), and Chinese netizens’ insatiable appetite for more information–the 
mixture of all these factors is a perfect recipe for rumors and sensational stories. Rumors 
were indeed plentiful, one outstripping the next in its sensationalism, and these largely 
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pointed to three crimes that were perceived to have led to Bo’s ouster. First and foremost, 
there are various accounts of his corruption, ranging from taking bribes and embezzlement to 
graft and selling state assets for personal gain. In one of the more extreme versions, the 
amount of wealth Bo and his family accumulated was said to be more than $1.2 billion 
(Osnos, 2012). The second explanation was that he spied on other Politburo members 
including the President and Party Secretary Hu Jintao (Johnson, 2012a). Citing ‘a dozen 
people with party ties’ who had requested anonymity, the New York Times believed that the 
hidden wiretapping ‘provided another compelling reason for party leaders to turn on Bo.’ 
Then there were racy stories of Bo’s sexual relationships with many women, the most famous 
of whom was the actress Zhang Ziyi. Zhang subsequently filed a libel suit against two Hong 
Kong newspapers and the U.S.-based Boxun website, and won the case in December 2013 
(BBC, 2013). On top of all these accusations, Wang Lijun’s attempted defection to the U.S. 
and the alleged murder of British businessman Neil Heywood by Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, 
turned the scandal into even more of a global media spectacle. 
      It appears that all the rumors and leaks from anonymous sources were undermining the 
party’s effort to contain the most serious political infighting since 1989. The colorful details 
released via various non-state sources were in sharp contrast to the brevity of Xinhua reports. 
For the first time, the secretive world of CCP elite politics was exposed in a highly 
mediatized manner, thanks to the combined influence of Chinese social media and 
international news outlets. Nonetheless, I would suggest that the media logic behind the 
political spectacle, expressed through sensational stories, converged with the intention of the 
CCP elite to depoliticize the events.  
      The international media are eager for a scoop on the political drama. For one thing, 
nuanced discussion of the historical context of Chinese politics does not make good headlines 
and could very well confuse non-Chinese readers. Scandalous details of corruption, betrayal, 
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murder and spying sell much better and are easily digestible. More importantly, given 
Western liberal media’s entrenched attitude toward Chinese socialism, the egalitarian policies 
and socialist discourse that Bo had been promoting in Chongqing were not something they 
shared ideological affinity with. As a result, mainstream English-language news media that 
had never been famous for agreeing with the Chinese government endorsed Wen Jiabao’s 
warning against repeating the Cultural Revolution. The day after Wen made this comment at 
an NPCC press conference, the Financial Times commented that ‘Mr. Wen is correct to warn 
that a move toward Bo Xilai’s style of politics would take China in precisely the wrong 
direction—away from a more open and law-governed society and back towards a more 
capricious and dangerous style of populist politics’ (Financial Times, 2012). The New York 
Times sketch of Bo is telling: ‘Tall, charismatic and unusually loquacious for a Chinese 
official, Mr. Bo, 63, had led a ‘red’ campaign in the teeming mountain city that called on its 
citizens to sing Mao-era songs. While popular among the city’s 32 million residents, Mr. 
Bo’s style unnerved many who said his tactics threatened to revive the destructive leftist 
ways of the past.’ (Jacobs, 2012)  
      Much as the top CCP leaders, the international media and Chinese Internet companies 
each have their own agenda to pursue, they ended up sustaining a highly sensational, yet 
politically neutralized, media spectacle of the Bo Xilai trial. Lin Chun observes: 
 
The current crisis may be the last milestone in the Chinese path of negating socialism. What is 
extraordinary about it is the alliance of a Communist leadership, rightwing anti-Communist 
factions inside and outside China (including Falun Gong), and western governments and press 
– a phenomenal example of 21st-century postmodern politics. (Lin, 2012) 
Maybe all this is not so post-modern after all, if viewed with an understanding of the mutual 
constitution of political logic and media logic. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is a well-known fact that struggles between factions at the highest level of the CCP have 
often been played out in the guise of anti-corruption investigations, especially during 
leadership transitions (McGergor, 2010). Bo Xilai is not the first to have experienced a 
sudden fall from political superstar to convicted criminal, although his privileged background 
as a ‘princeling’ made the downfall seem particularly dramatic. Nonetheless, two things set 
the story of Bo apart from previous cases such as those of Chen Xitong and Chen Liangyu.  
      First, the conflict between Bo and the central leadership is not only a political struggle 
over which faction gets a larger share of power. It is also an ideological struggle that laid bare 
the contradictions between the Party’s socialist promise and capitalist policies. By invoking 
China’s socialist legacy in order to articulate a political agenda prioritizing redistribution and 
shared prosperity, Bo Xilai trespassed on two forbidden zones. One was the central 
leadership’s monopoly over the appropriation and reinterpretation of revolutionary history. 
The other was the Party’s ongoing effort to push aside socialist discourse with non-
ideological promises of things like a ‘harmonious society’ and a ‘Chinese dream.’ If what we 
usually see in China is mediatization without politics, or mediatization in lieu of politics, the 
Bo Xilai scandal was an exception to this. Sun observes that the Chinese state media has 
mostly pursued mediatization by the government rather than mediatization of the government, 
as one does not see the debates between different factions within the party; instead, one only 
sees consensus when policies are announced. Such a strategy has been largely successful ‘in 
maintaining stability and promoting national unity’ (p.103), and this was an important reason 
why Bo Xilai and his Chongqing Model were perceived by some top leaders as a threat. 
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      Second, Bo’s ouster and subsequent conviction was a highly mediatized event that 
unfolded on global information networks. In this process, the role of media institutions went 
far beyond providing a communication platform. The media performed an important political 
function in configuring the dominant narrative reinforcing neoliberal hegemony. Some 
scholars have been critical of media marketization in China, which is widely regarded as a 
state-initiated and closely monitored project intended to serve two purposes—achieving 
economic profitability and sustaining political legitimacy (Jiang, 2014; Lee, He, & Huang, 
2006; Lee, He, & Huang, 2007; Qiu, 2007; Sparks, 2010; Zhao, 1998). This line of argument 
tends to place the media on the receiving end of state power, by focusing on the evolution of 
the state-control mechanism and how the party-state is constantly co-opting the commercial 
media into the authoritarian propaganda machine (e.g., Brady, 2008; Lee, et al., 2006). The 
mediatization perspective helps to highlight the power of the media themselves at both 
institutional and discursive levels. As much as both the structure and the content of Chinese 
media are products of the authoritarian state, their own need to survive and to be sustainable 
propels media institutions into taking strong initiatives to shape their environment. Since 
merely claiming loyalty to the regime is no longer sufficient for their survival in a 
competitive market, media organizations now make calculated moves to strengthen their 
position as the only access to truth.  
      In the light of the mediatized politics of the Bo Xilai case, the quote at the beginning of 
this article is a pertinent reminder of the dialectics between mediatized ideological struggle 
and the ideology of media logic. As the power of the media permeates modern life, political 
actors are developing new strategies for exploiting mediatized visibility, especially at a time 
of conflict and struggle. This can be achieved either by discursive means such as constructing 
certain narratives or by institutional means such as censorship, building communication 
capacity or the reconfiguration of communication networks. On the other hand, media logic 
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itself is highly ideological given its affinity with market capitalism and middle-class 
orientation. Whenever we try to read politics in a mediatized manner, we need to be wary of 
the tensions between visibility and invisibility, inclusion and exclusion in global 
communication networks. 
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1
 It is worth pointing out that Cui Zhiyuan, a leading leftist intellectual who has been critical 
of neoliberal economic policies, served as the Deputy Director of municipal government 
Commission for State-owned Assets during Bo’s tenure in Chongqing.  
2
 http://money.163.com/keywords/9/c/91cd5e86536b89c6/1.html 
 
